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Abstract 
 
 
 
Theory predicts that optimal effective corporation tax rates will be  
negatively related to industry specific sunk costs, and hence industry 
concentration.  Governments should tax industries with monopolistic power 
softly. Evidence suggests that this Schumpeterian (1942) principle of 
corporate taxation was used widely across industries in France, Italy and the 
UK in the 1990s. 
 
 
Keywords:   Effective Corporation Tax Rate, Industry Sunk Costs,  
   Industry Concentration. 
JEL classifiers:  H25 and L52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©  The authors.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be 
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source 
 
I. Introduction
In this paper we resurrect an important debate on the relationship between corpo-
ration tax and market power that dates back to Schumpeter (1942) and Galbraith
(1973). Galbraith felt that highly concentrated industries should be taxed heav-
ily. Corporate taxation could be used to alleviate monopolistic power. Schumpeter
presents us with the opposing view and emphasizes the drawbacks of taxing pow-
erful industries heavily. In his view, corporation taxes can create distortions in the
dynamics of the industry evolution and can reduce social welfare in the long run.
The existing game theoretic models of imperfect competition add little to this
debate. The reason for this is that any (proportional) tax on profits, in the short-run
(fixing the number of companies), does not aﬀect the first order conditions of profit
maximization. Equilibrium prices and quantities are the same with and without
taxes on profits, so the arguments that corporation taxes should be used in order
to mitigate monopolistic power seem not to be relevant. Moreover, if the revenue
collected by the government becomes public spending, and consumers and firms are
weighted equally in the welfare function, corporation taxes are also welfare neutral.
Indeed, within a traditional oligopoly model, there seems to be no reason to analyze
the eﬀects of corporate taxation.1
In this paper, using a Sutton (1991) approach to industry evolution, we investigate
how optimal corporation tax should be designed in reaction to industry specific sunk
costs in long run equilibrium. We first write down a general oligopoly model to show
that optimal profit taxation is negatively related to industry specific sunk costs once
a degree of monopolistic power survives in long run equilibrium. We then illustrate
our point with an example considering a Cournot oligopoly game at the long run
equilibrium. Within a Cournot oligopoly, Von Weizsa¨cker (1980) shows that the long
run equilibrium number of firms may exceed the socially optimal number of firms.2
1The existing literature on taxation in oligopoly focuses on the diﬀerent forms of commodity
taxation, ad valorem and specific (see Kay and Keen, 1983; Delipalla and Keen, 1992; Anderson et
al., 2001, inter alia), without taking into consideration taxation on profits.
2See also Martin (1984), Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987). The
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A forward looking government will regulate entry in a way that is socially desirable
with corporate taxation. In the short-run, taking the number of companies as a
given, profit tax has a neutral eﬀect on quantity and price outcomes in oligopoly.
However, corporation tax has implications for the evolution of market structure, a
point neglected by the existing academic literature. Clearly, the number of firms
operating in long run equilibrium can be aﬀected by the level of profit taxation. Such
dynamics, if understood by a perfectly informed forward looking government, should
be taken into account in the design of optimal corporation tax.3 By focussing on
the influence of corporation tax on market structure, our study shows that industries
characterized by high sunk costs, which are ceteris paribus, linked to concentrated
industries, should be taxed softly. On the contrary, when sunk costs are low, the
opposite holds true.4 The principle of taxation highlighted in this paper is analogous
to that found in Ramsey (1927) pricing. The interaction of imperfect competition,
strategic reactions of players in the industry, with policy instruments, can create large
tendency toward excessive entry in Cournot equilibrium is due to the ”business stealing” eﬀect. In
such markets, the profit maximizing entry decision of individual firms does not consider the negative
externality that entry imposes on incumbent firms. The resulting equilibrium number of firms is
excessive from a social point of view.
3In case of commodity taxation, the issue of entry in oligopoly has been considered in Auberbach
and Hines (2002), based on earlier work by Seade (1980a; 1980b), Besley (1989), Myles (1989), Deli-
palla and Keen (1992) and de Meza, Maloney and Myles (1995). We could also consider commodity
taxation but our focus is on profit (or corporation) tax in isolation because, despite its relevance in the
real world, there is no theoretical reason for this tax in oligopoly (short-run equilibrium neutrality).
As we point out, it does shape long run equilibrium structures.
4Our theory will predict diﬀerent rates of taxation for diﬀerent industries. In reality corporate
tax rate is the same for all industries it is the eﬀective corporation tax rates across industries that are
diﬀerent. This results from heterogeneity in the take up of tax allowances, exemptions, and exclusions
designed by government. In the real world we see that high-tech industries to pay less tax, we explain
why. In long run equilibrium, the number of firms in the industry reflects the condition that ex-post
entry profits equal sunk cost expenditure. Two instruments are available to the Government, tax
profit diﬀerently or give diﬀerent tax oﬀsets (credits) against the nature of sunk costs (for example
R&D), in the end, it the same thing. The theory section of the paper focuses on diﬀerent taxation
rates but it easy to the equivalence of taxation and credits in this framework. Hence we work with
eﬀective taxation in the empirical section.
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distortions as a by product of government intervention. The more monopolistic power
in an industry the bigger these distortions. Hence a forward looking government is
forced to internalize this and will tax industries will higher sunk costs (monopolistic
power) less.5 In our empirically sections we provide suggestive evidence that this
Schumpeterian (1942) principle of taxation was used in France, Italy and the UK.6
II. Theory
A. The Model
The economy is composed by M industries. The inverse market demand in industry
j = {1, 2, 3, ...,M} is given by a function pj : R+ → R+, with ppj < 0 and pppj >
0. Every firm operating in industry j is assumed to posses the same production
technology exhibiting constant returns to scale; kj ≥ 0 is the unit cost of production.
Industry j‘s output is Qj =
Pnj
i=1 qij , where qij represents the quantity produced by
5Walsh and Whelan (1999) highlight the dangers of government policy (ban on loss leading in
supermarkets) that try to move industries from second towards first best outcomes in the presence
of endogenous imperfect competition. The interaction of imperfect competition , strategic reactions
of players in the industry, with policy instruments, if unanticipated, can move you back to a third
best outcome.
6In large economies the majority of tax income from corporate taxation come from large indigenous
industries. For this reason we are happy to focus on an industry specific explanations for diﬀerences in
eﬀective corporation taxation. Vandenbusshe and Tan (2005), focusing on company specific eﬀects,
show that foreign owned companies have more favorable eﬀective corporate taxation relative to home
companies. They show how multinationals can use outside options to bargain down taxation with
local governments. Allowing for open economy considerations in the design of corporation taxes
would be an interesting extension to our framework. We feel that tax competition over interregional
or international investment flows would reinforce the incentive to tax high sunk cost industries ever
softer. There are many US and European studies that measure the sensitivity of investment flows
to corporate taxation. Deasi et al (2002), Hines (1999), Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Altshuler
et al (1998). In addition, there maybe an interesting interaction of open economy considerations
and industry specific tax allowances and exceptions that would have implications on the financing of
multinational corporations. One nice thing about our set-up is that we do have an outside option in
the model which could easily used to allow for two region model to address the issue of (international)
tax competition. We feel that cross border competition would reinforce our results.
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firm i = {1, 2, 3, ..., ni} in the j− th industry. Gross operative profits (before tax) for
a generic firm in industry j are then given by:
πij = (pj − kj) qij (1)
In every industry, the government imposes a proportional corporate income tax
τ j ∈ (0, 1) on each firm‘s operative profits. Net profits (after tax) correspond to
(1− τ j)πij . For each firm entering industry j, there is an entry (set up) sunk cost
equal to Fj > 0. Once in the market, the firm i‘s problem consists in setting qij so
as to maximize its profits. The first order condition of firm i‘s problem turns out to
be (assuming an inner solution exists):
(1− τ j)
h
ppj (1 + θj) qij + pj − kj
i
= 0 (2)
where θj = dQ−ij/dqij , as in Bresnahan (1989), takes on a value between zero and
one. It determines how much marginal revenue falls due to price competition increas-
ing as output expands. If we define λj = 1+ θj , λj ∈ [0, nj ] captures firms‘ strategic
interactions in industry j. With λj = 0, conjectures are competitive in industry j;
λj = 1 corresponds to Cournot conjectures and λj = nj corresponds to tacit collusion
in industry j.
Notice that the term 1 − τ j can be canceled out, meaning that the profit max-
imizing quantity chosen by each firm does not depend on τ j . for any given nj . Let
q∗j (nj , kj , θj) denote the symmetric equilibrium quantity and π
∗
j (nj , kj , θj) denote
the equilibrium operative profits, both depending on the number of firms, the level
of production costs in industry j and the theta, θj ,parameter.
A firm will find it profitable to enter industry j if and only if:
Π∗j = (1− τ j)π∗j − Fj ≥ Π (3)
where Π ≥ 0 is the outside option.
We look at the equilibrium with free entry. Under the assumption of free entry,
Π∗j is driven to Π, meaning that the entry process stops when all the industry specific
profit opportunities have been exploited. Since this is true for all industries, no matter
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where a firm decides to enter, the equilibrium profit corresponds to the outside option.
By solving (3) for π∗j , we get:
π∗j =
Fj +Π
1− τ j
(4)
Clearly, this entry condition will drive a negative relationship between nj , via equi-
librium profits π∗j (nj), the level of fixed cost, the corporation tax and the outside
option. The revenue collected by the government in industry j, which amounts to
njτ jπ∗j , is supposed to be entirely spent in a productive way. Accordingly, the overall
government spending that results is written down as:
G =
MX
j=1
nj
τ j
1− τ j
³
Fj +Π
´
(5)
In the equilibrium with free entry, social welfare is given by:
W = G+NΠ+ CS (6)
where NΠ =
PM
j=1 njΠ is the sum of all industry profits and CS =
PM
j=1CSj is the
aggregate consumers‘ surplus, with CSj equal to:
CSj =
QjZ
0
pj(Qj)dQj −Qjp(Qj) (7)
We are interested in characterizing the optimal behavior of a forward looking
government seeking to maximize social welfare. By definition, a forward looking gov-
ernment is able to anticipate the number of firms in each industry at the end of the
entry process. Let nLj
³
τ j , kj , Fj ,Π, θj
´
stand for the number of firms operating in
equilibrium in industry j as a function of the level of corporation tax, unit cost of
production, entry sunk cost, the outside option and theta (intensity of price compe-
tition), such that the participation constraint (3) is just binding. In the long run we
have:
G =
MX
j=1
nLj (..., τ j , ...)
τ j
1− τ j
³
Fj +Π
´
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NΠ =
MX
j=1
nLj (..., τ j , ...)Π (8)
CSj =
Qj(nLj )Z
0
pj(Qj(n
L
j ))dQj −Qj(nLj )p(Qj(nLj ))
The government‘s maximization problem writes:
P
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max
τ1,τ2,...,τM
W = G+NΠ+CS
s.t. τ j ∈ [0, 1) and nj = nLj (.)
We are interested in determining the sign of dτ∗j/dFj . By solving the above
government‘s problem we get the following:
Proposition 1 The higher the entry sunk cost in industry j the lower the optimal
corporation tax rate should be in that industry.
Proof. The generic first order condition of is7
dW
dτ j
=
1
(1− τ j)2
(
Fjn
L
j − (t− 1)
dnLj
dτ j
"
Fjτ j − (t− 1)
dCSj
dQj
dQj
dnLj
#)
(9)
In order to assess which is the relationship between the level of optimal corporation
tax and the level of entry sunk costs in each industry, by using the implicit function
theorem, we can write:
dτ∗j
dFj
∝ d
2W
dτ jdFj
Notice that d2W/dτ jdFj ∝ nLj +A+B with
A =
dnLj
dFj
⎧
⎨
⎩Fj + (1− τ j)
2
⎡
⎣
Ã
dQj
dnLj
!2
d2CSj
d2Qj
+
dCSj
dQj
d2Qj
d2nLj
⎤
⎦ dn
L
j
dτ j
⎫
⎬
⎭ (10)
and
B = (1− τ j) τ j
dnLj
dτ j
(11)
7Throughout the paper, second order condition are always satisfied. For the sake of simplicity,
without any loss of generality, we have assumed that Π = 0.
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Let us define φ
j
= −dnLj /dFj Fj/nLj the elasticity of the number of firms w.r.t.
the sunk cost in industry j. By assuming that d2CSj/d
2Qj < 0, φj > 1 is suﬃcient
to prove that dτ∗j/dFj < 0. Assuming that the Sutton p(n) function is well behaved,
we need the optimal number of firms in an industry to respond to the sunk entry cost.
In other words we need to assume a certain level of monopolistic power determining
short run pricing and entry for our results to hold.
B. Example
In order to illustrate Proposition 1, let us provide a simple example. The following
assumptions are made:
A1: the inverse market demand is pj = 1−Qj
A2: once in the market, production entails no cost (kj = 0)
A3: the outside option Π is normalized to zero
A4: firms compete a la Cournot (λj = 1)
After routine computations, the symmetric Nash equilibrium quantity produced
by each firm turns out to be:
q∗j =
1
1 + nj
(12)
and the associated per firm Nash equilibrium net profits amount to:
Π∗j = (1− τ j)
µ
1
1 + nj
¶2
− Fj (13)
A firm decides to enter if and only if Π∗j ≥ 0. Under the assumption of free entry,
Π∗j is driven to 0. By solving (13) for nj , the resulting number of firms operating in
industry j in equilibrium with free entry obtains:
nLj =
2
s
1− τ j
Fj
− 1 (14)
As a consequence, in each industry, the lower the corporation tax rate the higher the
number of firms in the market. By choosing a small τ j the government can induce
more entry and vice versa. Hence, τ j becomes a tool to regulate entry.
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Using the definition of public spending (5) and aggregate consumers‘ surplus (7),
social welfare can be written:
W =
MX
j=1
"
nj
µ
τ j
Fj
1− τ j
¶
+
1
2
µ
nj
1 + nj
¶2#
(15)
Since the government is forward looking, it is able to anticipate the eﬀect of τ j on the
entry process in each industry correctly, implying that nj = n
L
j . The government‘s
maximization problem becomes:
P
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max
τ1,τ2,...,τM
W =
MP
j=1
∙
1
2
+ Fj
µ
1− 2
r
1− τ j
Fj
− 1
2 (1− τ j)
¶¸
s.t. τ j ∈ [0, 1)
The optimal solution to P is given by:
τ∗j = 1− 3
p
Fj (16)
which always satisfies second order conditions. Clearly, the relationship between τ∗j
and Fj is negative.
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By plugging (16) into (14), the equilibrium number of firms operating in the long
run obtains:
nL∗j =
1− 3
p
Fj
3
p
Fj
(17)
By solving (17) for Fj , and by using symmetry, i.e. the fact that 1/n
L∗
j is the
equilibrium market share of each firm in industry j, we get:
Fj =
HHI3j
(1 +HHIj)
3 (18)
where HHIj = 1/n
L∗
j is the index of market concentration in industry j (Herfindal-
Hirschman Index). Given that ∂HHIj/∂Fj > 0, the higher the sunk cost, the higher
market concentration. By plugging (18) into (16), the expression of optimal corpo-
ration tax can be rewritten:
τ∗j =
1
1 +HHIj
(19)
8The elasticity of nLj with respect to τ j evaluated at the optimum is εj = 1/(2 3
p
Fj).
9
The following Figure illustrates the relationship between optimal corporation tax and
market concentration in industry j.
Figure 1
6
-
τ∗j
1
0
1/2
1 HHIj
In the equilibrium with free entry:
pL∗j =
3
p
Fj ; Q
L∗
j = 1− 3
p
Fj (20)
while welfare turns out to be:
WL∗ =
MX
j=1
"
3
p
Fj + 2
¡
3
p
Fj
¢4 − 3Fj
2 3
p
Fj
#
(21)
Notice that limFj→0W
L∗ → M/2, with ∂WL∗/∂Fj < 0. The lower the barriers to
entry, the higher the level of social welfare in presence of optimal corporation tax.
It is worthy to remark that low barriers to entry are associated with high corporate
taxation. In order to restrict entry in a socially desirable way, if Fj → 0 then τ∗j → 1.
Proposition 2 Under Cournot competition a high sunk cost in industry j (a high
HHIj) yelds a low optimal corporation tax rate to be imposed in that industry.
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Now, let us compare nL∗j with (14) when τ = 0:
nNTj =
1
2
p
Fj
− 1 (22)
where the superscript NT stands for no tax. We can immediately verify that, nL∗j <
nNTj , i.e. the number of firms operating in the long run when an optimal corporation
tax is introduced is lower than the number of firms that would have entered the
market without taxation. We know from the existing literature that, in absence of
taxation, there is an excess of entry with respect to the second best solution.
Let us characterize the second best solution of the entry process. We are about
to show that by choosing the optimal level of corporation tax τ∗j it is possible for the
government to achieve the socially desirable number of firms in each industry. The
government‘s maximization problem writes:
P
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max
n1,n2,...,nM
WSB =
MP
j=1
h
nj
³
π∗j − Fj
´
+ CSj
i
s.t. nj ≥ 1
The optimal solution to is given by:
nSBj =
1
3
p
Fj
− 1 (23)
which corresponds to nL∗j .
Proposition 3 A forward looking government may influence the entry process in a
way that is socially desirable. The second best solution is achieved by choosing τ∗j .
We have shown that in presence of forward looking governments, τ j can be used
in order to regulate the entry process in a socially desirable way. In the next section
we will investigate whether the empirical relationship between market concentration
and corporation tax is consistent with the principle of taxation derived in this section.
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III. Stylized Facts
A. Data Sources
We use a commercial database of company accounts, sold under the name Amadeus
by Bureau Van Dijk. This commercial database of company accounts is comparable
to the Compustat database in the US or the Exstat database in the UK. A growing
academic literature uses the Amadeus data, (see Budd et al (2002), Konings et al
(2001) and Vandenbusshe and Tan (2005)). We use data for companies in 220 NACE
Rev1 manufacturing sectors across France, Italy and UK, during three periods 1996-
1998. Companies in the data set have to satisfy at least one of the following criteria:
(i) number of employees greater than 100, (ii) total assets exceeding 16 million USD
and (iii) operating revenue exceeding 8 million USD respectively. The coverage of
medium and large sized enterprises is good in these set of countries. We construct
annual measures of eﬀective corporation tax and the HHI of company assets for each
NACE sector using, on average, 6,639 French, 7,747 Italian, and 9,077 UK companies.
We measure company size as the value of tangible and intangible fixed assets
(in thousands USD). The HHI (Herfindal-Hirschmann Index) is use to measure the
concentration of company assets within NACE sectors. We take this to be an outcome
of high sector specific sunk costs. Eﬀective corporation tax rate is measured at the
overall tax payout over operating revenues (in thousands USD) of each company.
Data limitations only allow us to work with the overall tax take and not just the
profit tax take. We also prefer to work with a measure of the corporation tax rate
as the overall tax payout over operating revenues (in thousands USD), rather than
operating profits. We do this for two reasons, tax is overall taxation (not just profit
taxation) and sales are reported better than operating profits, less incentives for
creative accounting. The idea is to normalize the tax take by the upper bound on
tax revenue for each company. Results are not that diﬀerent if one wished to use
operating profits.
The eﬀective corporation tax rate at the sector level is measured as a weighted
sum of company eﬀective tax rates (weighted by size of company fixed assets). Across
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sectors diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates result from the diﬀerent take up of tax al-
lowances, exemptions, and exclusions. Industries with diﬀerent sunk cost configu-
rations, for example R&D expenditures, have diﬀerent abilities to benefit from the
tax incentives designed by government. Our measure of the eﬀective corporate tax
rate reflects such idiosyncratic features of industries (see MARC, (1999), Gropp and
Kostial, (2000) for arguments that explain why company level eﬀective tax rates are
diﬀerent and why they should be used in the construction of industry and country
level eﬀective tax rates). Murphy (2005) constructs eﬀective tax rates for countries
using the Amadeus data and compares them to alternatives measures and data for
EU countries. Levels and trends over the 1990s are very similar.
B. Empirical Results
Our theory predicts that (optimal) eﬀective industry level corporation tax rates
should be negatively related to the concentration of assets within industries (proxy
for monopolistic power) Using the Amadeus data we aggregate over companies to
construct panel data on ECRTR (eﬀective corporate tax rates) and HHI for around
220 4-digit NACE manufacturing industries in France, Italy and the UK. In Figure 2
we document industry level eﬀective corporate tax rates relative to the overall manu-
facturing mean. By normalizing 4-digit NACE manufacturing industries corporation
tax rates by the overall manufacturing mean within a country, we see clearly, within
each country, the co-existence of low and high eﬀective corporation taxation across
industries. Industries with diﬀerent sunk cost configurations have diﬀerent abilities
to benefit from the tax incentives (allowances, exemptions, and exclusions), designed
by governments. In Figure 3 we see the spread in the concentration of assets by
industry. Industry structure tend to be highly correlated across countries. Due to
industry specific sunk cost configurations rather than from any integration process.
The question is, do the sunk cost considerations that drive industry structure also
drive the level of eﬀective corporate taxation?
In Table 1 we estimate using OLS and GLS (controlling for sector unobservables.
with random eﬀects), that industry level eﬀective corporate tax rates are negatively
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correlated with the concentration of assets within industries. Even if one runs com-
pany level regressions clustered by industry, controlling for company heterogeneity
(age, size, ownership), one still finds a significant negative correlation of eﬀective cor-
porate tax rates with industry level concentration. This is clearly suggestive that our
Schumpeterian principle of taxation was used across industries within these countries
in the late 1990s.
IV. Conclusions
Using a Sutton (1991) approach to industry evolution, our IO approach links optimal
eﬀective corporation tax rates to the nature of sunk costs within industries. Theory
predicts that industry level optimal eﬀective corporation tax rates will be negatively
related to the concentration of assets within industries. The principle of taxation is
very Schumpeterian, driven by a healthy respect of governments for industry dynam-
ics. In our empirically sections we provide suggestive evidence that this principle of
taxation was widely used across industries in France, Italy and the UK in the late
1990s.
Our theory could be extended to test the robustness of this principle of taxation.
We feel the presence of endogenous sunk costs or rent seeking sunk cost expenditures
(allowing companies to move before the government) would not change the govern-
ments incentives to tax concentrated industries softly. Open economy considerations
such as the intensity of tax competition over investment flows (the design of financing
or R&D incentives for multinational corporations) are also likely to be related to the
nature of industry specific sunk costs leading to further incentives for governments to
tax concentrated industries softly. Even though there is a large literature on corpora-
tion taxation in Public Finance and International trade, we feel it is not a good idea
to ignore industry specific eﬀects, in particular the literature on market structure, in
the modelling of eﬀective corporate taxation.
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Figure II Distributions in NACE 4-digit industries ECTR’s during 1996-1998
relative to 1 (the overall manufacturing mean across Time).
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Figure III Distributions of HHI (in company assets) across NACE 4-digit indus-
tries 1996-1998
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Table 1: Correlations between NACE 4-digit industries ECTR’s and HHI’s over
the period 1996-1998.
ln  (E C T R ) F ran ce Ita ly   U K  
 O LS  G LS  O LS  G LS  O LS  G LS  
R 2 .10  .10  .11  .11  .10  .10  
C on stan t 1 .9  
(6 .5 ) 
1 .9  
(4 .8 ) 
1 .3  
(6 .8 ) 
1 .3  
(4 .9 ) 
.76  
(11 .9 ) 
.75  
(11 .3) 
ln  (H H I)  -.38  
(6 .8 ) 
-.35  
(5 .0 ) 
-.22  
(6 .0 ) 
-.21  
(4 .22) 
-.28  
(3 .5 ) 
-.24  
(2 .6 ) 
T im e D u m m ies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es 
R an d om  E ffects   N o Y es N o  Y es N o  Y es 
#  4 -d ig it N A C E  227 227  220 220  223  223  
#  o f O b servation s 673 670  658 655  662  659  
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